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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
M U R R A Y FIRST THRIFT AND
LOAN COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
DWAYNE STEVENSON and CAROLYN STEVENSON, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
13820

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises from an action by Plaintiff-Respondent for declaratory judgment that certain recorded assignments of contract by a non-party contract buyer are
valid security interests in the Defendants,-Appellants,
real property.
Appellants deny any right or interest in the Respondent and Counterclaimed to clear the unlawful clouds
against their title to the real property and recover the
damages occasioned thereby.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was decided by the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, without any material issues of fact, upon cross Motions by both parties for Summary Judgment supported
by their Memorandum of Points and Authorities. The
trial court granted Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment and held, as a matter of law and equitable
relief, that the recorded Assignments of Contract were
enforceable against the Appellants who were thereby
adjudged liable to the Respondeat for the sum of $7,188.77.
Defendants take exception and appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek a reversal of the Summary Judgment of the trial court and remand for a trial upon damages sustained by the Defendants as a result of the Plaintiff's willful and unlawful clouds on Defendants' real
property.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
There was no conflict in the facts.
Sometime in August, 1967, Mr. and Mrs. Stevenson's employment compelled them to leave Utah and
they began negotiations to sell their home to Jerry
W. Cooper and Candy Cooper. The Stevensons and
Coopers discussed their respective demands and requirements and eventually reached compatible terms of sale.
A standard form Uniform Real Estate Contract was prpared by Mr. Stevenson and executed by the Stevensons
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and Mr. and Mrs. Cooper on the 29th day of August,
1967. Paragraph 3 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract
included a typewritten clause that:
" . . . The Buyers agree that they cannot
assign, sell or transfer their interest in this Contract without specific written permission of the
Sellers
"
The Coopers began to experience financial difficulties and Mr. and Mrs. Stevenson permitted them
a number of payment extensions in an effort to be of
assistance. While the Coopers were thus some $800.00
delinquent in their contract payments, they apparently
contacted the Respondent Murray First Thrift and Loan
Company requesting a personal loan in the sum of $6,610.90 for a purpose unknown. The Coopers and Murray
First Thrift and Loan Company decided between themselves that they would execute and accept a form "Assignment of Uniform Real Estate Contract" to secure
their Agreement. Despite the clear and unequivocal restriction against assignments, neither the opportunistic
Coopers nor Murray First Thrift and Loan Company
ever contacted Mr. and Mrs. Stevenson.
On the 5th day of February, 1974, Murray First
Thrift and Loan Company recorded its first "Assignment
of Uniform Real Estate Contract" with the Office of the
Salt Lake County Recorder against the Appellants' fee
title. Still, there was no notice to, or written permission
from, the unknowing Appellants.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It appears that in September, 1973, the Coopers and
Murray First Thrift and Loan Company either reconstructed their first arrangement or negotiated a second
loan for the sum of $7,188.77. Again both the Coopers
and Murray First Thrift and Loan Company totally ignored Mr. and Mrs. Stevenson and on the 28th day of
September, 1973, the second "Assignment of Uniform
Real Estate Contract" was recorded by the Respondent
against the Appellant's residence.
Jerry W. Cooper filed his Petition in Bankruptcy
with the United States Bankruptcy Court on the 20th
day of November, 1973 and listed both the Appellants
and Respondent as creditors. At the First Meeting of
Creditors held on December 11, 1973, Mr. Stevenson was
informed, for the first time, of the Coopers-Murray First
Thrift and Loan Company's credit arrangements and the
unpermitted, recorded "Assignments" against their real
property. The next day Mr. and Mrs. Stevenson formally
demanded that Murray First Thrift and Loan Company
remove the wrongful "Assignments" and clear the title
to their property. See, Defendants' Exhibit "2". Murray
First Thrift and Loan Company refused to comply with
the demands and initiated this action against Mr. and
Mrs. Steveson claiming a right to perfect an interest by
virtue of the "Assignments".
The Appellants were never notified of the transactions affecting their fee title by either the insolvent
Coopers or the Assignee-Respondent and they have never
given their written permission, consent or assent to any
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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assignments of the August 29, 1967 Uniform Real Estate
Contract.
These facts are established by the record submitted
on appeal as set forth in the Memorandum of Points
and Authorities filed by both parties in support of their
respective Motions for Summary Judgment; and, by the
trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;
and, by the trial court's Judgment and the Statement of
Proceedings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE E X P R E S S P R O H I B I T I O N
AGAINST ASSIGNMENT OF THE STEVENSON-COOPER UNIFORM REAL ESTATE
C O N T R A C T AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACTURAL CONDITION PRECEDENT
TO AN ASSIGNMENT FROM COOPERS TO
RESPONDENT WHICH WOULD BE EFFECTIVE AGAINST THE APPELLANTS.
Contracts are generally assignable to third parties
unless the original obligor and obligee expressly agree to
restrict assignments as part of their contractural consideration. § 70A-2-210 (2) (3) Utah Code Annotated.
Specifically, there are two types of porohibitions
against assignment of contracts:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(1) General Restrictions, which declare the agreement nonassignable without any exception or recourse.
55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, § 432, Page 842; or,
(2) Restrictions requiring the permission of the
seller before assignment, which is the type involved in
the Stevenson-Cooper Contract and is a condition precedent that the Seller's written permission must be obtained before a valid assignment by the Buyer. 55 Am.
Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, § 435; Lockerby v. Amon,
64 Wash. 24, 116 P. 463 (1911); Smith v. Martin, 94 Or.
132, 185 P. 236 (1919); Goddard, Non-Assignment Provisions in Land Contracts, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1932).
An express condition precedent to assignment is for
the sole benefit and protection of the obligor-seller who
thereby reserves a right to contract only with the original
obligee-buyer. Restatement of Contracts, 2d § 149 (2)
Assignment of Rights, Comment (a). Concurrently, where
the obligee-assignor contracts in assignment without the
obligor's required written consent, the assignee can only
acquire rights against the obligee-assignor. Fox-Greenwald Sheet Metal Co. v. Markowitz Bros., 452 F. 2d 1346,
1351 (1971); Johnston v. Landucci, 21 Cal. 2d 63, 130 P.
2d 405 (1942).
In the present case the express term of agreement
between the Stevensons and Coopers restricting cootrtactual assignment without prior written permission may
not invalidate the subsequent, unpermitted contracts of
assignment as between Coopers and the Respondent.
However, the overwhektiing weight of authority holds
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Respondent cannot acquire any right or claims against
either the Appellants or their fee title to the real property.
Professor Williston's treatise on the Law of Contracts
states the rule in point as follows: "In an agreement to
convey real estate it is not unusual to provide that the
vendee shall not assign his right to conveyance and the
provision is usually upheld; so, likewise, of a provision
in a contract to sell goods that the buyer shall not assign
his right" Williston on Contracts, § 422. Corbin on Contracts § 873 at 491.
The rule that restrictions of non-assignahility are
for the exclusive benefit of the obligor has been adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in PortugueseAmerican Bank v. Welles, 242 U. S. 7, 37 S. Ot. 3, 61 L.
Ed. 116 (1918) and the United States Court of Appeals
in Fox-Greenwald Sheet Metal Co. v. Markowitz Bros.,
452 F. 2d 1346 (1971) where it was stated:
"Judicial holdings sustain overwhelmingly
the proposition that a contractual ban on assignment ordinarily serves to protect the obligor
alone, and in no way imperils the transactions
as between assignor and assignee . . . The obligor,
of course, may gain from a valid and unwaived
nonassignability provision the prerogative to resist or even nullify the assignment . . ." 452 F.
2d at 135. (Emphasis added.)
See also, Johnston v. Landucci, 21 Cal. 2d 63, 130
P. 2d 405, 408 (1942).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the case of Smith v. Martin, 94 Or. 132, 185 P.
236 (1919), the Plaintiff Smith agreed to sell his real
property to G. D. Eatinger by a contract rontaining a
condition precedent to assignment that " . . . he [Eatinger]
will not assign or transfer this Contract, nor deliver the
possession of said premises to any person or persons
whomsoever without the consent in writing of the said
first party [Smith]," Eatinger took possession of the real
property and promptly attempted to assign his interests
to the Peninsula Security Company which, in turn, entered into a lease arrangement with the Defendant, Martin. Martin's arguments and briefs were submitted by
the Peninsula Security Company which curiously alleged
that it had no knowledge of the condition to assignment.
The Supreme Court of Washington addressed itself to
the law regarding non-assignment conditions in real property lease and/or sales contracts and held that:
"A 'contract' may be defined to be an agreement between two or more parties competent
to contract, upon a sufficient consideration, to
do or not to do a particular thing which lawfully
may be done or omitted. Hence the parties could
provide that the contract should not be assigned without the written consent of one of
them. There was nothing unlawful or contrary
to public policy in such a stipulation, and under
proper conditions the same may be enforced.
. . ." " . . . in Behrens v. Cloudy, 50 Wash. 400,
97 Pac. 450, a lease contained covenants of the
lessors to sell the land to the lessee in eight
months at the latter's option, and also the covenant of the lessee not to assign any part of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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lease. The Plaintiff had taken an assignment
of the option without a written consent as required by the contract, and sued to compel specific performance. The court held that the covenant against the assignment was lawful and that
the purchaser without written consent acquired
no rights. In another Washington case, BondsFoster Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific Railroad
Co., 53 Wash. 302, 101 Pac. 877, it is laid down
as a rule that —
'One who accepts an assignment of a
contract which by express terms is made
nonassignable acquires only a cause of action against the assignor.'" Smith v. Martin, 185 P. at 238 (citations omitted).
The case of Lockerby v. Anton, 64 Wash. 24, 116 P.
463 (1911), follows a series of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington and is factually
identical to the case now before this Court. There, Mr.
and Mrs. Amon entered into a written contract with Mr.
Swingle agreeing to sell their real property for $1,600.00
with principal and interest payments to be paid within
two years. The original sales contract also provided that:
"It is further agreed that no assignment of this agreement
shall be valid without the consent and signature of W. R.
Amon and Sarah Amon . . .". Swingle assigned the contract to a Mr. Johnson who then tendered the full performance. The Amon's properly refused to recognize any
right or interest in Johnson and the latter brought an
action for specific performance which was pursued by
Mr. Lockerby following Johnson's death. The trial court
dismissed the action for specific performance and held
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that the contract was non-assignable. Affirming the trial
court's decision, the Washington Supreme Court stated:
"It is not denied that stipulations of the
character relied on in this case are lawful and
binding upon the parties. There validity has
been admitted by this court . . . (Citations
omitted.)
A vendor may have confidence that his
vendee will not use the property to his disadvantage. It is his privilege to decline to deal
with strangers. Or he may, by limiting the right
of assignment, save any questions as to the interest of intervening third parties, a result not
all together unlikely under our community property system. Or he may be unwilling to assume
to pass upon the legal sufficiency of an assignment. The better rule is stated in Omaha v.
Standard Oil Company, 5 Neb. 337, 75 N. W. 859,
wherein it is said: Tt compelled the city to deal
with strangers, and to determine, at its peril,
which of the contesting claimants was entitled
to the fund. This may have been one of the very
contingencies contemplated by the city, and
against which it sought to provide by making
the contract nonassignable. Another object in
view might have been to prevent the company
from losing interest in the performance of the
contract by divesting itself of all beneficial interest therein. But it is needless for us to speculate on the motives for the city's action. It is
enough for us to know, whatever its reasons may
have been, that it has in plain language stipulated
against the assignment of the contract. That
stipulation is valid and must be enforced. (Citation omitted,,)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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One who accepts an assignment of a contract
which by express terms is made non-assignable
acquires only a cause of action against the assignor.' See also Behrens v. Cloudy, 50 Wash.
400, 97 P. 450. Whatever may have been the
reasons for reserving the right to decline to deal
with an assignee, such reservation contravenes no
rule of public policy, and is enforceable. We attach no importance to the clauses of the contract
in which the word 'assignee' is used. They will be
construed in light of the whole contract, and,
when so regarded, must be taken to mean such
assignees as the vendor is willing to accept." 101
Pac. at 463-64.
The recent Utah case of Blair Enterprise v. M-B
Super Tire Market, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 192, 499 P. 2d 1294
(1972), involved a written Real Estate Purchase Contract
whereby Blair agreed to sell M-B real property located
on Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The contract did
not contain any conditions on assignment and Defendant
M-B assigned its interest to Mr. Smith. The seller brought
an action to declare the original contract unenforceable
and the assignment of ". . . no force or effect." The
District Court of Salt Lake County granted Summary
Judgment to M-B Super Tire Market. On appeal this
Court affirmed the trial court's decision and included
the following guideline:
"(1) There being no restrictions in the real
estate purchase contract against its assignment,
and the contract requiring the plaintiff to convey to the defendant or its assigns, the assignment was, and is, in all particulars valid, legal
and enforceable as against the plaintiff." 92
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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C. J. S. Vendor and, Purchaser, § 311, p. 192,
and cases cited. Blair Enterprises v. M-B Super
Tire Market, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 193. (Emphasis
added.)
The assignments by the Coopers to the Respondent
purports to convey all of the Cooper's "right, title and
interest" in the Uniform Real Estate Contract. However,
all of the "right, title and interest" in the contract is subject to a valid and express condition precedent which
by overwhelming authority prohibits any assignment without the Appellant's written permission. The Stevenson's
permission was admittedly neither sought nor obtained
by the parties to the assignment and, therefore, no "right,
title or interest" in the Uniform Real Estate Contract
or real property was conveyed by the Coopers to the Respondent.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE CLAUSE RESTRICTING
ASSIGNMENT OF THE S T E V E N S O N COOPER CONTRACT WITHOUT THE SELLER'S WRITTEN PERMISSION WAS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO VALID ASSIGNMENT; AND, THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S
C O M P L A I N T THEREFORE FAILS TO
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
THE APPELLANTS.
It is established that the Stevenson-Cooper Uniform
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Real Estate Contract gave the Buyer a right to acquire
fee title pursuant to the terms and conditions of the
agreement
The terms of sale including the price, method of payment and interest are consideration for the contract and
are rights reserved for the benefit of the Appellants. A further term of the agreement expressly restricts assignment without the Appellant's written permission and is
also consideration for the contract established for the
benefit of the Appellants. Finally, the terms of the agreement regarding breach and default by the Buyer are
consideration for the contract reserved for the benefit
of the Appellants.
It is an accepted rule of law that "in the case of a
contract for the sale of land, which gives the Buyer an
immediate equitable property right, the equitable right
cannot be more extensive than is fixed by the Contract
that created it." Williston on Contracts, § 422 at 130.
The assignments and nonpayments placed the Coopers
in breach of contract. The Respondent, with constructive notice of the breach by assignment, can not
benefit, much less receive, an interest in a contract which
it knowingly violated. Respondent's subsequent recording
of the wrongful assignments constitutes an unlawful cloud
which the Appellants are entitled to have removed and
then proceed to recover any damages occasioned thereby.
The claims or remedies of the Respondent, if any,
are limited solely to an action against the Coopers on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
their Promissory Note and/or the terms of the CooperMurray First Thrift and Loan assignments.
Therefore, Murray First Thrift and Loan Company
has no cause of action against the Appellants and, the
Appellants' Counterclaim for an unlawful cloud is proper.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT EQUITABLE RELIEF WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO AN ORDER OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF
THE COOPER-MURRAY FIRST THRIFT
AND LOAN ASSIGNMENTS.
The case of Thein v. Silver Investment Company,
87 Cal. App. 2d 306, 1% P. 2d 956 (1948), presents a
situation similar to the case at issue. There, the Defendant, Silver Investment Company, contracted to sell its
real property to a Mr. Artz with the express condition
precedent that " . . . no assignment of this contract shall
be valid without the written consent of the sellers." Artz
attempted to assign his interests to the Plaintiff, Thein,
who ultimately brought an action against the original
obligor, Silver Investment Company for specific performance of the land sales contract. Silver Investment Company, counterclaimed to quiet title and recover damages
for its lost rentals.
The California. Appellate Court affirmed the Superior Court's denial of Thein's action for specific performDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ance; quieted title in the Defendant with an award of
damages and, in determining that the Seller had complied
with all aspects of the contract stated:
". . . The contentions that equity abhors
forfeitures and will grant relief, where possible,
from a forfeiture, need not be considered at
length. Equity does not aid one who is the sole
cause of his own misfortune. Any forfeiture that
here resulted was caused by appellant's [Thein]
own acts. Under such circumstances, no principal of equity suggests, far less compels, the granting of relief to appellant. He has brought his misfortunes upon his own head. (Emphasis added.)
190 P. 2d at 962.
In the instant situation, any loss to the Respondent
results from its own willful acts in entering into an assignment of a Uniform Real Estate Contract which clearly, upon its face, prohibited assignment without the Appellants' written permission. Such a self-inflicted injury
is insufficient cause to invoke the equitable powers of a
Court to grant specific performance; especially, in light
of the considerable damage and expense that the Respondent's conduct has visited upon the innocent Appellants
who had, as consideration for the original contract, sought
to protect themselves against just such injury arising
from an unfortuitous assignment.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE RESPONDENT HAS A "SECURDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
ITY INTEREST" IN THE APELLANTS'
REAL PROPERTY.
The trial court improperly held that by virtue of the
prohibited assignments, Murray First Thrift and Loan
Company acquired! a "security interest" in the Stevenson's real property which has both the operation and
effect of making the Stevensons debtors of Murray First
Thrift and Loan Company with an interest in the Stevensons' real property.
Generally, a real property "security interest" is established either by mortgage or deed of trust which must
be executed by the party to be charged. § 76-1-14, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended). A valid security
interest in personal property also requires that the intended debtor execute a valid "Security Agreement", and
there can be no attachment or perfection of any "security
interest" until there is: (a) a signed agreement, and
(b) value is given to the debtor by the secured party, and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral. §§ 7GA-9-203,
204(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended).
In the case now before this Court there is absolutely
no document executed by the Appellants or recorded
either as a mortgage or deed of trust in favor of the Respondent. There is no signed Security Agreement between Appellants and Respondent. There has been absolutely no value given by Respondent to the Appellants
and there is no privity of contract between the parties.
Therefore, the Respondent cannot acquire a valid "securDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ity interest", claim or right, either by statute or at common law in the Appellant's real property and the decision of the trial court must be interpreted as creating a
secured debt in the Appellants' real property without any
consideration being given or received.
POINT V.
SIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATIONS OF PUBLICE POLICY REQUIRE THIS COURT TO
REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT AND UPHOLD THE SANCTITY
AND INTEGRITY OF CONTRACTS.
It is for the good of the public that the law jealously
defends the integrity of contracts and thereby insures
to the people that when they find mutual assent and an
exchange of valuable consideration in an arm's length
transaction the lawful terms that they bargained for will
be performed or, that a remedy for failure to perform
the terms will be afforded by recourse to a court of law.
The decision of the trial court in this case must be
reversed in order to preserve the ability to reach a meaningful contract. In the Stevenson-Cooper contract, the
original parties had found mutual assent and exchanged
valuable consideration in binding themselves to a reasonable and enforceable agreement. Part of the consideration which finally compelled the Appellants to enter into
the contract was in the form of an express condition
against assignment without their written permission. But
for the Cooper's agreement to abide by the non-assignaDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
bility condition the Appellants would not have entered
into the contract. The effect of the trial court's decision
is to deny this valuable consideration and encourage the
breach of other contracts similarly negotiated.
The value of this condition precedent is further illuminated by the fact that it was demanded in order to protect the Appellanits from the expenses and troubles of
litigation and unlawful clouds against their title which
might result from an assignment of the contract against
their better interests. The wisdom on their intent is now
apparent. Had the Coopers, then seriously in default of
payments, sought the required permission to assign the
contract as security for Respondent's Promissory Note,
the permission would, reasonably enough, have been denied. The resulting cloud on the Appellants' title and
expense of these proceedings would have been avoided.
The trial court's decision frustrates the clear intentions
of the original contracting parties and should be reversed.
The Appellants have gained absolutely nothing by
the improper Cooper-Murray First Thrift and Loan Company Assignments. The decision of the trial court will
encourage further insubstantial credit arrangements and
has the affect of creating a $7,188.77 debt against the
Appellants where there has been no consideration or
privity of contract whatsoever.
The decision of the trial court, beyond interfering
with the integrity of contract, may act to rescind all
of the existing Uniform Real Estate Contracts in the
State of Utah which contain restrictions against assignDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ability. The ruling therefore encourages, if not insures,
extensive and unnecessary litigation as well as injury
to other innocent parties.
CONCLUSION
By ignoring the express restriction against assignment of contract as a valid condition precedent to an
enforceable assignment of the contract between the
Coopers and the Respondent, the trial court committed
substantial and prejudicial error as a matter of law.
The trial court further erred in ruling that the Respondent had acquired a "Security Interest" in the Appellants' real property where there is no supportive document or consideration.
The trial court further erred in granting the Respondent equitable relief which was clearly unwarranted by
any review of the facts.
Finally, considerations of public policy and the sanctity of contracts require that the Judgment of the District Court be reversed and the case remanded for a trial
to determine the amount of damages suffered by Appellants.
Respectfully submitted,
STEVEN FLINT LOWE
Attorney for
Defendants-Counterclaimants
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